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Abstract
An attempt is made to de¯ne main problems of the privatization
theory and to present a survey of some results in this area. Two models
are discussed that demonstrate paradoxical consequences of property
right restrictions and dynamics of property right redistribution which
entails a strati¯cation of society. Two ways of transition from cen-
tralized to a market system (through privatization and through price
liberalization processes) are compared in frameworks of a mixed econ-
omy model with queues. Relations between theoretical conclusions
and real issues of the Russian privatization are discussed as well.
0. INTRODUCTION
Privatization is the central point of reforms taking place in the East Euro-
pean countries during last ¯ve years. Time to time privatization cases occur
in capitalist economies as well but they are sporadic events. Therefore I
guess, ¯ve years ago there were not so many theoretical researches devoted
to privatization phenomena. I would like to mention Sappington and Stiglitz
(1987), Chamberlin and Jackson (1987), Vickers and Yarrow (1988). Now we
have great experience and an explosion in number of investigations on pri-
vatization in East European countries and Russia. A very incomplete list of
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references includes Fisher and Gelb (1990), Tirole (1991), Nuti (1992), Tardos
(1992), Fridman, Rapazinski (1993), Rutgaizer (1993), Blanchard, Comman-
der and Coricelly (1994), Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), · Capek (1994).
There are scrupulous descriptions and analyses of di®erent projects of pri-
vatization, a row of models are developed. One can expect that very soon
we will have a privatization theory which can be compared with theories of
in°ation, unemployment or rationing.
The goal of this survey is to outline some problems which, I think, are
important for the future theory of privatization, and to discuss some recent
theoretical contributions. I do not pretend to build a unique model covered a
wide range of relevant topics. What I would like to present is a row of di®erent
and very simple models that reveal important questions and possible answers.
Some widely accepted theoretical assumptions are discussed in a context of
Russian privatization processes.
The plan of the paper is as follows.
Section 1. What kind of economic system should we create?
1.1. Private owned or labor managed enterprises?
1.2. Should the concentration of property be prevented?
1.3. Comparative statics of property right restrictions: a paradox.
1.4. Mechanisms of concentration: property right dynamics.
Section 2. Sequencing and speed of privatization
2.1. Could we justify the shock method of privatization?
2.2. Liberalization or privatization: what should be the ¯rst?
Section 3. Privatization, recession, and monopoly power.
3.1. Privatization and recession
3.2. Does privatization decrease monopoly e®ects?
Section 4. Concluding remarks3
1. WHAT KIND OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM
SHOULD WE CREATE?
1.1. Private owned or labor managed enterprises?
In the process of privatization an enterprise can be sold or transferred to
its workers, to its managers, to institutional investors (such as investment
funds), to citizens or to the state. They are players in the game which has
property right distribution as an issue.
In Russia this game was played in a revealed form. There were three
variants of privatization. Due to the ¯rst variant, the majority of shares was
got by outside shareholders (institutional investors or citizens). The second
variant meant that labor collectives received at least 51% of the voting shares.
The third variant transferred main part of a ¯rm to its managers. In Russia
labor collectives won the ¯rst part of the battle. Despite all e®orts of the
Russian government to sell enterprises to outside owners, about 65% of ¯rms
chose the second variant and their labor collectives received control packages
of shares.
It was a result of long history of relations between the state and en-
terprises. During the history the state power turned out to be weaker and
weaker, and administration of enterprises felt itself more and more dependent
on labor collectives. Even before privatization, particularly after destruction
of ministry and party systems, labor collectives considered themselves as real
owners of their ¯rms (Polterovich (1993a)).
Now the process continues. Securities are redistributed and it is un-
clear what kind of property right structures will be settled as a result of the
process. Many economists want pro¯t maximizing agents and competitive
markets. It means compulsion of enterprises to change behavior, to decrease
number of employees, to refuse from ¯nancing of their own social infrastruc-
ture: kindergartens, sport centers, holidays homes. Many ¯rms ¯nanced such
kinds of social structures in the recent past and some of them do the same
now. In Russia and in other East European countries one can observe a pe-
culiar cooperative system of inner- and inter¯rm relations, which is probably
incompatible with western patterns of competitive behavior. Should it be
destroyed? Practice shows that creation of private owned ¯rms can be very
costly due to resistance of labor collectives.4 1. WHAT KIND OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM SHOULD WE CREATE?
The question \What kind of economic system should we create?" is the
most important since it entails the design of a concrete privatization scheme.
Its deeper discussion is out of the scope of this paper. I would like to underline
only one conclusion that turned out to be more evident after the experience
of privatization than before. The answer on the question depends not only
on comparisons of di®erent property right systems but also on the informal
property right relations historically established in the society.
A related but less pretentious question is the following: should the priva-
tization lead to (more or less) uniform distribution of property or there are
no reasons to concern about it? Many researchers considered the concen-
tration of property in hands of the few as an evil and suggested receipts to
prevent it. The simplest way is to use nontradable vouchers as it was done
by the most countries conducting voucher privatization. In the next sections
I discuss J. Roemer's model of limited privatization, compare schemes using
tradable and non-tradable vouchers, and consider a model of property right
redistribution which leads to the concentration of capital.
1.2. Should the concentration of property be prevent-
ed? 1
In Roemer (1993) an interesting model is proposed which includes four types
of mechanisms or institutions: mechanisms of distribution of resources and
distribution of property rights, a rule to choose a volume of investments,
and a political mechanism for choice of public bad levels. The central point
of the paper is a very old and important question: should capital (or using
marxist language, means of production) be considered as a private owned
and tradable good or it is common property of the whole society and every
person has equal rights for its return? Professor Roemer argues that the
socialist variant can be better for the majority of society if one takes into
account public bads.
Public bads are goods that enter negatively into the utility functions of
citizens but positively into production functions of ¯rms. There is endowment
di®erentiation in the model but the initial property rights are uniformly
distributed among the population. In the capitalist variant of the model these
1This and two next sections contain a discussion and generalization of results from
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rights can be sold. One can expect that the property will be concentrated in
the hands of the rich. The rich will derive a large fraction of their incomes
from pro¯t of the ¯rms. Hence they will support a high level of production
and therefore a high level of public bads. If the class of capitalists has strong
in°uence on political decisions then restrictions of pollutions are low and
the technological regimes are harmful for the most citizens. It is a reason
to prevent formation of the capitalist class. The author realized the idea in
the socialist variant of the model where the property rights are not tradable.
He built an example and show by calculations that uniform allocation of
property rights can be better for most citizens than the market allocation.
It is well known that in the presence of externalities market allocations
should not be Pareto-optimal and therefore an intervention of a central body
can turn out to be useful. But property right restrictions entail economic
losses for society, and I do not believe that this instrument is appropriate to
overcome the shortcomings of high di®erentiation of wealth. This problem is
discussed in the next section.
1.3. Comparative statics of property right restrictions:
a paradox
One can think that if the government introduces restrictions on the volume
of property in hands of one person then the property is distributed more
uniformly and the poorer part of population gains. Mainly due to this point
voucher trading was prohibited in Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Mongolia. Un-
like these countries Russia adopted a free trading scheme. Its supporters
argue that tradability is more preferable for the poor people since it means a
possibility to sell vouchers and to get more money for immediate consump-
tion needs (Boycko et al. (1994)). Both arguments are true to some extent.
The problem is related to a more general question: \Do the poor gain if
the property right of the rich is stronger restricted?" It is obvious that the
answer is \not always". But one can give an answer in a more speci¯c form.
Let us consider a system of agents each of them is described by the fol-
lowing maximization problem:
max ui(ci;¾i); (1.1)
ci + ¾ip = wi + p=n; (1.2)
¾i · ±i: (1.3)6 1. WHAT KIND OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM SHOULD WE CREATE?
Agent i chooses her consumption ci, and a shareholding ¾i. Her endow-
ment is denoted by wi; p is a present price (in good units) of the privatized
property (¯rms); n is the total number of population. Property right restric-
tions ±i are constants.
Let the supply of the shares (or vouchers) be equal to 1 and each share
gives the right for a ¯xed future consumption volume. Then the utility func-
tion u can be considered as depending on present and future consumptions
ci, ¾i.
Suppose that there are two types of agents i = 1;2, and ni is the number
of agents of type i.
An equilibrium is de¯ned as an array of a price p, and shareholdings
¾i, and quantities ci such that every pair ci;¾i is a solution of the problem
(1.1){(1.3) under p = p, and the balance of shares holds:
n1¾1 + n2¾2 = 1:
Let w2 > w1, and assume that usual concavity conditions are valid for
u1;u2, and
u1(c1;¾1) = f(c1) + g(¾1); ±1 = 1; ±2 = ±; 0 < ± < 1: (1.4)
So the rich people only are restricted in property rights, they are per-
mitted to own not more than fraction ± of the total production. If ± = 1
then we have a competitive pure exchange equilibrium, if ± = 1=n then
¾1 = ¾2 = 1=n.
Let us study the dependence of equilibrium utility values on restriction ±.
We will consider p, ci, ¾i and Vi = ui(ci;¾i) as functions of ± assuming
they are well de¯ned and smooth on an interval ¢ = f±: 0 < ± < ±Mg, where
±M is a minimal ± under which the equilibrium coincides with the competitive
one. Then ¾2(±) = ± for ± 2 ¢. Let 1=n 2 ¢. This is true if, for example,
agents have the same utility functions and future consumption is a normal
good. To see it one should remember that the second agent is richer.
Let 0 and 00 be symbols of taking ¯rst and second derivatives, and let
º = n2=n1. If ± 2 ¢ then one has
¾1 = (1 ¡ n2±)=n1; c1 = w1 + p(± ¡ 1=n)º; (1.5)
g0(¾1) = pf0(c1) (1.6)1.3. Comparative statics of property right restrictions: a paradox 7
Hence











0(c1)(dc1=d± ¡ pº) = f
0(c1)(± ¡ 1=n)º dp=d±: (1.8)
We assume that f, g are concave and increasing functions. Therefore




00(c1)c1 ¸ (® ¡ 1)f
0(c1) for some ®; 0 · ® < 1; and all c1 > 0: (1.9)
Obviously (1.9) is valid if f is a homogeneous function of degree ®. Let
us prove that dp=d± > 0 for all ± 2 ¢. If ± · 1=n, this is true due to (1.7).
Let ± > 1=n. Using (1.5) and (1.9) one has f0(c1)c1 + pf00(c1)c1(± ¡ 1=n)º ¸
f0(c1)[w1 + p®(± ¡ 1=n)º] > 0. Hence, dp=d± > 0 and V1 reaches its global
minimum at ± = 1=n. It has two local maximum points: at ± = 0 and at
competitive equilibrium.
One can suggest the following partial explanation of these paradoxical
results. Equal initial shareholdings make relatively larger contribution to
the income of the poor; the relation between incomes approaches to 1 under
price increasing. Tighter restrictions entail a decrease of demand for property
and hence a decrease of its price. Therefore relative income di®erentiation
increases. This fact plays a dominating role under ± > 1=n, therefore the
less is ± the larger are losses of the poor . But if ± < 1=n then another
circumstance turns out to be dominating: the rich are forced to sell a part of
their vouchers, and the poor get a possibility to buy property at lower prices
under lower ±.
Maybe even more paradoxical is the possibility demonstrated below: the
rich gain due to their property right restrictions.
Since ¾2 = ±, c2 = w2 + p(1=n ¡ ±), one has
dV2=d± = u21[(1=n ¡ ±)dp=d± ¡ p] + u22; (1.10)8 1. WHAT KIND OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM SHOULD WE CREATE?
where u21, u22 are partial derivatives of u2 with respect to the ¯rst and second
arguments at point (c2;¾2). Due to optimality condition, we have
pu21 · u22 (1.11)
with equality at the competitive equilibrium, i.e. under ± = ±M > 1=n. It
follows from (1.10), (1.11) that dV2=d± > 0 under ± · 1=n and dV2=d± < 0
in a small left vicinity of ± = ±M. It means that V2(±) has a maximum inside
the interval (1=n;±M). Thus the rich gain from their restriction in a vicinity
of the competitive equilibrium.
Let us summarize the results.
Theorem 1. Let us suppose that
1) ui are increasing, strictly quasiconcave and twice di®erentiable; w2 > w1;
2) conditions (1.4) are valid, and f, g are strictly concave;
3) all equilibria are positive and unique for ± > 0; 1=n < ±M.
Then V1(±) reaches its local minimum at ± = 1=n and V2(±) decreases in
a left vicinity of the competitive value ± = ±M. If moreover (1.9) is ful¯lled
then V1(±) has its global minimum at ± = 1=n, and two local maxima: at
± = 0 and at the competitive equilibrium.
As an example, let ui = ci¾i, ni = 1, i = 1;2, w1 = 1, w2 = 3. The
condition (1.4) is ful¯lled for lnu1; this is su±cient for Theorem 1 to be
valid. One has the following dependencies Vi of equilibrium values of ui on ±
(Fig. 1). The poor have a global minimum at status quo, and two maximal
points. For the rich it is most advantageous to have the weak restriction
± = ±m = 0:59 < ±M = 5=8.
1.4. Mechanisms of concentration: property right dy-
namics
In the previous model wealth inequality was given at the beginning whereas
saving behavior of the agents could be identical. But an apologist of the
capitalist system should say that the richness is occasional only in the short1.4. Mechanisms of concentration: property right dynamics 9
run, and in the long run the rich are richer than the poor since they are more
thrifty.
To check this argumentation let us consider dynamics of property right
redistribution. To simplify the analysis I will not consider investment policy,
and will assume capital to be ¯xed, nondepreciated and equal to 1. It is used
to produce a unit of consumption good during one period of discrete time.
Figure 1
Assume that the behavior of agent i at period t is described by the fol-10 1. WHAT KIND OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM SHOULD WE CREATE?
lowing optimization problem
ui(ci) + ¸iui(¾i) ) max; (1.12)
ci + ¾ipt = ¾i t¡1 + ¾i t¡1pt; (1.13)
ci ¸ 0; ¾i ¸ 0; (1.14)
where ui is a utility function, t is discrete time, t = 1;2;:::; i 2 I; I is a
¯nite set of consumers, pt is a price of total capital at moment t. Let ¾i0 be
given, ¾i0 > 0,
P
i2I ¾i0 = 1.
An equilibrium trajectory fpt;fcit;¾itgi2Ig1
t=1 is a set of prices pt, con-
sumptions cit and shares ¾it of total capital such that for every t and i the
pair cit, ¾it is a solution of (1.12){(1.14) and the balance condition holds
X
i2I
¾it = 1: (1.15)
The problem (1.12){(1.14) re°ects agent expectations which can be not
realized2. But they are close to reality if ¾it approach some constants since
in this case cit ¡ ¾it ) 0.
Let us denote J = fj: ¸j = ¸ = maxi2I ¸ig.
Theorem 2. Let ui be increasing, di®erentiable, and concave functions, and
let u0




¾jt ) 1 as t ) 1:
Proof. It follows from optimality conditions and budget constraints that
ptu
0
i(¾it + (¾i t¡1 ¡ ¾it)(pt + 1)) = ¸iu
0
i(¾it): (1.16)
Therefore, due to concavity of ui, one has
pt · ¸i if ¾i t¡1 · ¾it;
pt ¸ ¸i if ¾i t¡1 ¸ ¾it: (1.17)
2I use \sliding plan method" to build an in¯nite time version of a ¯nite horizon model.
Another way is to implement an OLG model similar to Tirole (1985) where expectations
are supposed to be perfect.1.4. Mechanisms of concentration: property right dynamics 11
It follows from (1.15) and (1.17) that pt · ¸. If pt < ¸ then ¾i t¡1 < ¾it
for i 2 J. If pt = ¸ then ¾i t¡1 > ¾it for i = 2 J. In both cases St¡1 < St.
Therefore St ) S for some S > 0.
Let us prove that pt ) ¸. By contradiction, suppose pt(k) ) p < ¸
for some subsequence t(k). Then ¾i t(k)¡1 < ¾i t(k) for all i 2 J. Hence
¾i t(k)¡1 ¡ ¾it(k) ) 0 for all i 2 J. Since S > 0 one can suppose that
¾jt(k) ) ¾j > 0 for some j 2 J, and a contradiction follows from (1.16).
Since pt ) ¸ one has ¾i t¡1 > ¾it for i = 2 J in view of (1.17). Therefore
¾it ) ¾i for every i = 2 J. Due to (1.16) it is possible only if ¾i = 0. Hence
S = 1, and Theorem 2 is proved.
Thus the most patient agents turn out to be richer than others in the
long run independently on utility functions and initial conditions3.
This simple model supports a standard argument of free market apologists
that wealth di®erentiation derives from di®erent saving behavior even if we
ignore other abilities, heritance, and fortune. The most striking situation
occurs when two agents have identical one-period utility functions and utility
discount rates but di®erent planning horizons, and expect stable conditions
(including prices). A farther looking agent turns out to be more thrifty, and
she captures all the property in the long run. She reaches it due to decrease
of consumption at the beginning of the process.
One can suppose that the saving behavior is much more homogeneous
in developed societies than in underdeveloped ones. For example, in Russia
people traditionally do not like persons who accumulate money. It means
that this group includes only small part of population. So one can expect
that the degree of wealth di®erentiation will grow very fast.
There are two kinds of reasons why high level of wealth di®erentiation is
dangerous for society. Firstly, small group of the rich gets too much econom-
ical and political power and has a possibility to make decisions which can
be harmful for the majority. Another important reason is pauperization of a
large group of population and, as results, asocial behavior, criminal activities
and so on.
Thus the danger of overconcentration comes from di®erences in planning
horizons. But a ban of reselling of vouchers cuts o® the most far-sighted
part of population from investment decisions and prevents the capital °ow
3Similar facts were detected by Bewley (1983) and Guriev (1994) in frameworks of
quite di®erent models12 2. SEQUENCING AND SPEED OF PRIVATIZATION
from population to ¯rms. I do not know good solutions of the dilemma. It
is possible that a suitable compromise is a system of corporate ¯nance of
Japanese type (see, for example, Aoki (1988)) where concentration of capital
coexists with distribution of power among banks.
2. Sequencing and speed of privatization
An important problem discussed in many projects and papers concerns with
time sequencing and speed of the reform.
2.1. Could we justify the shock method of privatiza-
tion?
The Russian economy experienced two shocks at the beginning of 1992: shock
price liberalization and shock liberalization of foreign trade. Then very fast
privatization, creation of a new tax system and a new ¯nancial sector fol-
lowed.
During the term of voucher privatization since December 1992 till July
1994 there were privatized 15,052 large and medium sized industrial enter-
prises. These privatized ¯rms employ 17.4 million workers, which is 84% of
the total industrial employment. The total number of privatized ¯rms in-
cluding small enterprises in trade and services reached 106,000 at the end of
August 1994 and 112,000 at the end of 1994. At the end of June 1994 the
market share of private enterprises was 75% in retail trade, 66% in catering
and 77% in personal services. (Russian Economic Trends (1994), pp. 94{96;
Social-Economic Situation in Russia (January, 1995), p. 112). Shock type
reforms were conducted in some other East European countries as well.
This grandiose changes were preceded by debates about optimal speed of
privatization. Now they continue as a rather theoretical issue.
As the main argument, supporters of the shock are saying that a gradual
process would be too long and with high probability would be stopped due to
political pressure of dissatis¯ed social groups. Fast privatization is necessary
to increase e±ciency of production and prevent massive theft of state prop-
erty by managers after destruction of communist power. Since privatization
by sale of individual enterprises or their shares takes time for preparation2.1. Could we justify the shock method of privatization? 13
and since it is not popular for public, the only possibility turns out to be
mass privatization through vouchers (Boycko, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1994).
An attempt to justify fast privatization theoretically were developed in
Roland and Verdier (1994) and Laban and Wolf (1993). Whereas their mod-
els are di®erent and complicated the structures of their argumentation are
similar and based on so called critical mass e®ects. It can be illustrated by
a very simple model.
Let us consider n investors with unit of capital each. They can buy risk-
free assets or shares of privatized enterprises. Risk-free assets yield r per a
period of time. The yield of shares per a unit of money is a function f(K)
of total capital K invested by all participants. So each investor i should
maximize his/her payo® function
kif(K) + (1 ¡ ki)r
under the constraint 0 · ki · 1, where K =
Pn
i=1 ki. An increasing function
f(K) re°ects the fact that the probability of successful privatization increases
when the sum of investments raises (Laban and Wolf (1993)). Another inter-
pretation says that e±ciency of the private sector increases when the sector
grows since private enterprises need in private infrastructure (Roland and
Verdier (1994)). Let f(K¤) = r and n > K¤ > 1. Then the game has two
Nash equilibria: no privatization equilibria (ki = 0 for all i) or full privati-
zation equilibria (ki = 1 for all i). K¤ is a critical mass. If more than K¤ is
invested or if more than K¤ agents expect that more than K¤ will be invested
then full privatization will occur. But gradual privatization is impossible.
Arguments against too fast privatization were developed by Katz and
Owen (1993), Murrel and Wang (1993), Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess
(1994), Kazakevich (1994), Alexeev and Kaganovich (1994). One of the
main line of argumentation is the following. It is assumed that privatization
increases e±ciency of labor force. Due to downward rigidity of real wages this
leads to unemployment. But there is a policy constraint that de¯nes accept-
able levels of unemployment, and creation of new worker places takes time
and resources. Therefore the optimal time path of privatization is gradual
(Katz and Owen (1993)).
The necessity of a gradual approach can be demonstrated the most clearly
if one assume minimal wage requirement and immobility of labor force among
di®erent production sectors (Alexeev and Kaganovich (1994); immobility of14 2. SEQUENCING AND SPEED OF PRIVATIZATION
resources is supposed also in Murrel and Wang (1993)). Simplifying an exam-
ple by Alexeev and Kaganovich, let us consider an economy with two sectors.
Let their production functions be F1 = 108L
1=2
1 , F2 = 20L
1=2
2 where Li is a
quantity of labor used in sector i. Before privatization the sectors employ
L1 = L10 = 16 and L2 = L20 = 400 labor units, and the economy has 832
units of goods. The government distributes the goods uniformly, and each
worker gets 2 units. Suppose that labor is immobile, minimum real wage is
equal to 5/3, and unemployment compensation is set up as 4/3. There are
two independent labor markets and, due to low productivity of the second
sector, 364 units of labor turn out to be unemployed. The production falls
drastically up to 552 units. It is not enough to ful¯ll the subsistence con-
straint. So full privatization is impossible. A possible strategy is to privatize
¯rstly more productive sector 1. One can hope that it will gradually in-
crease its productivity being privatized, and the state will use taxes to cover
unemployment compensations for workers of the second sector.
Almost all researchers assume that e±ciency jumps at the moment of
privatization. It contradicts real data for Russia. In the survey described
in Bim (1994, p. 69) 100% of respondents said that privatization does not
increase e±ciency of their enterprises. For other surveys the results are not
so strong but generally a±rm the conclusion (see, for example, Dolgopyatova
and others (1994), pp. 25{26).
Another unexpected phenomenon of the Russian transition process is a
comparatively slow raise of unemployment. The level of production in 1994
was about 54% of the 1991 level, and it continues to decrease in 1995. In spite
of the huge recession the o±cially registered unemployment was 2.5% of labor
force in February of 19954. In contrast with a usual theoretical assumption
unemployment did not jump immediately after Russian privatization.
Probably, the most simple and realistic argument in use of gradual pri-
vatization is given in Kazakevich (1994). Privatization is costly in the short
run since it demands resources for restructuring and can give positive e®ects
in the long run only. Investments in privatization, like other investments,
should be implemented with an optimal rate. Only very fast growth of ef-
¯ciency could justify privatization shock. Such growth is not observed in
4Surveys show 7.4% of unemployment. Besides about 7% of workers were forced to rest
a part of working time (Social-Economic Situation in Russia (January{February, 1995),
p. 82{83)2.2. Liberalization or privatization: what should be the ¯rst? 15
Russia.
I think that both gradual and shock approaches catch some parts of truth.
One can not have a unique privatized ¯rm, a critical mass is necessary at the
beginning. But it does not mean mass privatization. Gradual approach
looks more well-founded economically but only experience could show if it is
politically possible.
2.2. Liberalization or privatization: what should be
the ¯rst?
The problem of sequencing was discussed intensively before the privatization
boom both on theoretical and political levels (Fisher and Gelb (1990), Ti-
role (1991), Rutgaizer (1993)). Prices of ¯rms should be de¯ned to conduct
privatization. Therefore liberalization should precede to create competitive
markets. At another hand it is di±cult to expect competitive behavior of
producers without private property. Hence privatization should be the ¯rst.
A possible solution is to have a package of reforms including creation of new
tax and ¯nancial systems.
In all socialist countries free markets were developed to some extent and
coexisted with a centralized state market. If one prefers gradual approach
then two ways of transition turn out to be possible. The ¯rst one is to
increase prices in the state sector step by step up to free market levels and
then to liberalize them without any shocks. The second way is the gradual
privatization so that larger and larger part of the total production would
be sold at free market prices. These two ways were compared by Fridman
(1994). She used frameworks of a model with queues developed by Stahl
and Alexeev (1985) and Polterovich (1993b). It turns out that for a simple
variant of the model stylized privatization is uniformly better then stylized
liberalization path.
Below we describe the model and prove the Fridman result under slightly
more general assumptions.
There is a representative consumer with a ¯xed positive income ¯ and
with a utility function u. The function depends on the n-dimensional con-
sumption vector c and on the leisure l. The allocation mechanism includes
queues, therefore the consumer can spend his total quantity of nonwork time
T for waiting and for leisure. A ¯xed commodity vector y is supplied. Some16 2. SEQUENCING AND SPEED OF PRIVATIZATION
part of it, the vector z, is supposed to be distributed through queues at ¯xed
prices p = (pi). If some price pi is too high then consumers refuse to buy
their rations of good i. All quantities which are not purchased at ¯xed prices
(including y ¡z and a residual of z) are sold in free markets at °exible equi-
librium prices p. So the rationing system of the good i really works only if
pi < pi.
There are two reasons to consider rationing and queues jointly with the
free market. As a rule, legal free markets coexist with other types of allo-
cation mechanisms even in centrally planned economies. Besides, there is
an illegal °ow of free market commodities as a result of underground pro-
ductions or stealing. These commodities don't come through rationing or
queue systems and are not paid at ¯xed prices. So, taking the free mar-
ket into consideration we re°ect the reality. The second reason is connected
with the problem of existence of equilibria in systems of rationing or queues
with reselling of commodities ¯rstly purchased at ¯xed prices. For such sys-
tems equilibria may not exist but arbitrary small free markets correct the
situation.
We describe the consumer behavior under queueing by the following op-
timization problem
max u(c; l); (2.1)
p(c ¡ d) + pd · ¯; (2.2)
¿d + l · T; (2.3)
c; d; l ¸ 0; (2.4)
where ¿ = (¿i) is a nonnegative waiting time vector. So, the scalar ¿i means
the quantity of time which is necessary to buy a unit of the good i at the
¯xed price pi.
De¯nition: An array E = (p;¿; e c; e d;~ l) is a queue equilibrium with black
markets if the triple e c; e d;~ l is a solution of the problem (2.1){(2.4), and the
following balance conditions are ful¯lled
e c = y; e d · z; ¿( e d ¡ z) = 0: (2.5)
The last of the conditions means null waiting times for commodities in
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A competitive equilibrium price vector pM is de¯ned as a vector such that
y is a solution of the problem
max u(c;T); p
Mc = ¯; c ¸ 0: (2.6)
Let us choose time horizon H and consider two variants of transition to
the competitive equilibrium during H steps:
Variant I: pt = p + (pM ¡ p)t=H;
Variant II: zt = z(1 ¡ t=H),
where t = 1;2;:::;H.
Variant I means gradual liberalization due to increase of state prices.
Variant II envisages gradual reswitching a °ow of goods z from the state
market to competitive one. It can be considered as gradual privatization.
Since equilibrium consumption is equal to y for every t in both variants
we should compare equilibrium values of leisure lt
I and lt
II for trajectories of
liberalization and privatization. One can expect that lt
I can be less than lt
II
for some t and greater than lt
II for others. Surprisingly, it is not the case.
Let us introduce the following assumptions.
1. The function u is separable: u(c;l) = f(c) + '(l).
2. The functions f, ' are smooth and concave; their derivatives f0, '0 are
positive, and f0(0) = 1, '0(0) = 1.
3. z < y, T > 0, ¯ > 0.
4. p < pM.
Theorem 3. Under the conditions 1{4 privatization is uniformly better
than liberalization: lt
I < lt
II for all t = 1;:::;H.
Proof. Let y, ~ l, e d be a solution of the problem (2.1){(2.4). Then there
exist positive numbers ¸, w such that the triple (y;~ l; e d) is a solution of the
problem
u(c;l) ¡ ¸[pc ¡ (p ¡ p)d + w(¿d + l)] ) max
c ¸ 0; d ¸ 0; l ¸ 0: (2.7)18 2. SEQUENCING AND SPEED OF PRIVATIZATION
Therefore
f
0(y) = ¸p; '
0(~ l) = ¸w; (2.8)
p ¡ p · w¿; (p ¡ p ¡ w¿) e d = 0; (2.9)
py = ¯ + w(T ¡ ~ l): (2.10)





Let p, ¿, y, ~ l, e d be an equilibrium in the model with queues. From (2.8),
(2.10), (2.11) one has
p =
f0(y)¯
f0(y)y + '0(~ l)(~ l ¡ T)
¸ p
M: (2.12)
Hence for our trajectories p > p. Since e d · z and ¿ e d = ¿z, by (2.9) we
get
w¿ e d = (p ¡ p) e d · (p ¡ p)z · w¿z = w¿ e d:
Thus
(p ¡ p)z = w¿ e d = w(T ¡ ~ l) = py ¡ ¯: (2.13)







0(~ l)(T ¡ ~ l) = ¸(p ¡ p)z = f
0(y)z ¡ ¸pz: (2.15)
The equation (2.15) de¯nes ~ l as an increasing function of ¸. Hence it is





M pM(y ¡ z)
¯ ¡ pz ¡ (pM ¡ p)zt=H
; (2.16)
¸II(t) =
f0(y)[y ¡ z(1 ¡ t=H)]
¯ ¡ pz(1 ¡ t=H)
= ¸
M pM(y ¡ z) + pMzt=H
¯ ¡ pz + pzt=H
; (2.17)
where ¸M is de¯ned from equality f0(y) = ¸MpM.19
Since pMy = ¯, it is easy to check that
¸I(0) = ¸II(0); ¸I(H) = ¸II(H) = ¸
M:
Furthermore, ¸I(t) and ¸II(t) are increasing functions of t, ¸I(t) is strictly
convex and ¸II(t) is strictly concave (Fig. 2).
Therefore ¸II(t) > ¸I(t) for all t, 0 < t < H. The theorem is proved.
Figure 2
3. Privatization, recession, and monopoly
power
3.1. Privatization and recession
In all East-European countries privatization was initiated by governments
which announced enhancing economic e±ciency and increasing ¯scal rev-
enue as main goals of the property right reform. Surveys show that both of
the goals were not reached during one or two years after large-scale privati-
zation. Revenues turned out to be insigni¯cant and privatized ¯rms did not
reveal substantial improvements in comparison with non-privatized enter-
prises (Nuti (1992), p. 199; · Capek (1994), p. 298; Bim (1994)).5 Enterprise
5Firms with participation of foreign capital revealed better performance.20 3. PRIVATIZATION, RECESSION, AND MONOPOLY POWER
behavior was not changed. One possible explanation is the following. Before
privatization the enterprises belonged to the state by law but in fact the state
had small in°uence on its decisions. The decisions were worked out on the
base of compromises among managers and workers, and the same mechanism
continues to work after privatization. Privatization did not change top man-
agers of the most enterprises and replacement of owners was a pure formal
action. Farther investigations are needed to check this guess.
The question discussed above is a part of more general problem about
relations between privatization and deep recession which took place in all
East-European countries.
3.2. Does privatization decrease monopoly e®ects?
At the ¯rst glance privatization should decrease the degree of monopolization
of an economy and therefore increase the production level. But it is not
necessarily so.
Indeed privatization leads often to disintegrations of large enterprises.
But one should distinct two types of disintegrations: horizontal (parallel
separation) and vertical (sequence separation) ones. It is obvious that hori-
zontal disintegration results decreasing of monopoly power. But it is not the
case for vertical disintegration.
It was proved in a number of papers (Vernon and Graham (1971),
Schmalensee (1972), Greenhut and Ohta (1979)) that vertical disintegration
increases the monopoly e®ect, rises prices and decreases outputs.
To present the essence of the arguments, let us consider the simplest case.
Let a production system have two subsystems with production functions
z = h(y), y = f(x), where x, y, z are quantities of a resource, an intermediate
good and a ¯nal good, respectively. (Fig. 3). The price of the resource is a
constant c; the price of the ¯nal good is a function q(z). Before privatization
the system is a monopoly, and its decision is derived from a problem
max q(h(y))h(y) ¡ cÃ(y); (3.1)
where Ã(y) = f(¡1)(y) is the inverse function for f. Let us suppose that after
privatization the system disintegrates into two ¯rms, each of them governs
the price of its own output, and does not in°uence the input price. Their3.2. Does privatization decrease monopoly e®ects? 21
decisions come as solutions of the problems
max q(h(y))h(y) ¡ p(y
¤)y; (3.2)
max p(y)y ¡ cÃ(y); (3.3)
where p(y) is the price of the intermediate good as a function of its volume,
and y¤ is given for (3.2). Let us de¯ne
p(y) = F
0(y); (3.4)
where F(y) = q(h(y))h(y). It means that y¤ is a solution of (3.2) for concave
















We suppose that the functions f, h, F are positive and increasing under
x > 0, y > 0, f is concave, F is strictly concave, q(z) is positive and decreas-
ing, all functions are smooth. Then the volume y of the intermediate good
before privatization is de¯ned from the equation
F
0(y) = cÃ
0(y): (3.5)22 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS






Since p0(y) < 0 one has (see Fig. 3): y¤ < y, and z¤ = h(y¤) < z = h(y),
q(z¤) > q(z):
Thus, if privatization leads to vertical disintegration of a production sys-
tem then the monopoly e®ect becomes aggravated: the system supplies less
and by a higher price.
In Russia there were a lot of cases of the vertical disintegration, so that
one can not wait improvements in this sense.
4. Concluding remarks
There are some important questions that were not concerned above. First of
all there is no good theory to explain why private property system is better
than centralized one. Following the well- known idea by R. Coase one can
suppose that transaction costs are much larger in huge hierarchies than at
free markets, and privatization should decrease the transaction costs. If one
could measure the transaction costs and privatization costs then an optimal
decision could be made by cost-bene¯t analysis.
Another problem that should be mentioned is the following.
In a row of East European countries one can observe the same stages
of the privatization process: spontaneous privatization, people privatization
(property distribution through vouchers or auctions), and money privatiza-
tion when large institutional or private owners buy the property). Probably
each stage has its own reasons and goals, and it would be interesting to study
it (see Polishchuk (1994)).
A very important problem is connected with property right protection.
In Russia we observe the lack of protection system. It leads to supremacy of
ma¯a and drastically increases the transaction costs. This is a very serious
obstacle for a success of the Russian transition process.23
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